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* selinux: fix dentry_open() error checkAkinobu Mita2006-11-271-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | The return value of dentry_open() shoud be checked by IS_ERR(). Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [NetLabel]: protect the CIPSOv4 socket option from setsockopt()Paul Moore2006-10-303-1/+54
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch makes two changes to protect applications from either removing or tampering with the CIPSOv4 IP option on a socket. The first is the requirement that applications have the CAP_NET_RAW capability to set an IPOPT_CIPSO option on a socket; this prevents untrusted applications from setting their own CIPSOv4 security attributes on the packets they send. The second change is to SELinux and it prevents applications from setting any IPv4 options when there is an IPOPT_CIPSO option already present on the socket; this prevents applications from removing CIPSOv4 security attributes from the packets they send. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* NetLabel: better error handling involving mls_export_cat()Paul Moore2006-10-153-13/+30
| | | | | | | | | | Upon inspection it looked like the error handling for mls_export_cat() was rather poor. This patch addresses this by NULL'ing out kfree()'d pointers before returning and checking the return value of the function everywhere it is called. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Bug fix in polidydb_destroyChad Sellers2006-10-111-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes two bugs in policydb_destroy. Two list pointers (policydb.ocontexts[i] and policydb.genfs) were not being reset to NULL when the lists they pointed to were being freed. This caused a problem when the initial policy load failed, as the policydb being destroyed was not a temporary new policydb that was thrown away, but rather was the global (active) policydb. Consequently, later functions, particularly sys_bind->selinux_socket_bind->security_node_sid and do_rw_proc->selinux_sysctl->selinux_proc_get_sid->security_genfs_sid tried to dereference memory that had previously been freed. Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matchingVenkat Yekkirala2006-10-113-14/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled" IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable xfrm(s) applied. The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of "deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by default" in the above case. This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context). Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied, such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). This patch: Fix the selinux side of things. This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated with the IPSec policy rule. Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case is now handled properly. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* NetLabel: use SECINITSID_UNLABELED for a base SIDpaul.moore@hp.com2006-10-111-20/+9
| | | | | | | | This patch changes NetLabel to use SECINITSID_UNLABLELED as it's source of SELinux type information when generating a NetLabel context. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* NetLabel: fix a cache race conditionpaul.moore@hp.com2006-10-111-16/+21
| | | | | | | | | | Testing revealed a problem with the NetLabel cache where a cached entry could be freed while in use by the LSM layer causing an oops and other problems. This patch fixes that problem by introducing a reference counter to the cache entry so that it is only freed when it is no longer in use. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Still more typo fixesMatt LaPlante2006-10-031-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* more misc typo fixesMatt LaPlante2006-10-031-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* [PATCH] r/o bind mount prepwork: inc_nlink() helperDave Hansen2006-10-012-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | This is mostly included for parity with dec_nlink(), where we will have some more hooks. This one should stay pretty darn straightforward for now. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] MLSXFRM: fix mis-labelling of child socketsDavid Woodhouse2006-09-291-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Accepted connections of types other than AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX won't have an appropriate label derived from the peer, so don't use it. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] pidspace: is_init()Sukadev Bhattiprolu2006-09-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is an updated version of Eric Biederman's is_init() patch. (http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/2/6/280). It applies cleanly to 2.6.18-rc3 and replaces a few more instances of ->pid == 1 with is_init(). Further, is_init() checks pid and thus removes dependency on Eric's other patches for now. Eric's original description: There are a lot of places in the kernel where we test for init because we give it special properties. Most significantly init must not die. This results in code all over the kernel test ->pid == 1. Introduce is_init to capture this case. With multiple pid spaces for all of the cases affected we are looking for only the first process on the system, not some other process that has pid == 1. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com> Cc: <lxc-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security moduleChris Wright2006-09-293-684/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This code has suffered from broken core design and lack of developer attention. Broken security modules are too dangerous to leave around. It is time to remove this one. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: support mls categories for context mountsCory Olmo2006-09-291-5/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allows commas to be embedded into context mount options (i.e. "-o context=some_selinux_context_t"), to better support multiple categories, which are separated by commas and confuse mount. For example, with the current code: mount -t iso9660 /dev/cdrom /media/cdrom -o \ ro,context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1,c3,c4,exec The context option that will be interpreted by SELinux is context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1 instead of context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1,c3,c4 The options that will be passed on to the file system will be ro,c3,c4,exec. The proposed solution is to allow/require the SELinux context option specified to mount to use quotes when the context contains a comma. This patch modifies the option parsing in parse_opts(), contained in mount.c, to take options after finding a comma only if it hasn't seen a quote or if the quotes are matched. It also introduces a new function that will strip the quotes from the context option prior to translation. The quotes are replaced after the translation is completed to insure that in the event the raw context contains commas the kernel will be able to interpret the correct context. Signed-off-by: Cory Olmo <colmo@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] inode-diet: Eliminate i_blksize from the inode structureTheodore Ts'o2006-09-272-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This eliminates the i_blksize field from struct inode. Filesystems that want to provide a per-inode st_blksize can do so by providing their own getattr routine instead of using the generic_fillattr() function. Note that some filesystems were providing pretty much random (and incorrect) values for i_blksize. [bunk@stusta.de: cleanup] [akpm@osdl.org: generic_fillattr() fix] Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] inode_diet: Replace inode.u.generic_ip with inode.i_privateTheodore Ts'o2006-09-271-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patches reduce the size of the VFS inode structure by 28 bytes on a UP x86. (It would be more on an x86_64 system). This is a 10% reduction in the inode size on a UP kernel that is configured in a production mode (i.e., with no spinlock or other debugging functions enabled; if you want to save memory taken up by in-core inodes, the first thing you should do is disable the debugging options; they are responsible for a huge amount of bloat in the VFS inode structure). This patch: The filesystem or device-specific pointer in the inode is inside a union, which is pretty pointless given that all 30+ users of this field have been using the void pointer. Get rid of the union and rename it to i_private, with a comment to explain who is allowed to use the void pointer. This is just a cleanup, but it allows us to reuse the union 'u' for something something where the union will actually be used. [judith@osdl.org: powerpc build fix] Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Judith Lebzelter <judith@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: fix tty lockingStephen Smalley2006-09-261-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Take tty_mutex when accessing ->signal->tty in selinux code. Noted by Alan Cox. Longer term, we are looking at refactoring the code to provide better encapsulation of the tty layer, but this is a simple fix that addresses the immediate bug. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: convert sbsec semaphore to a mutexEric Paris2006-09-262-5/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch converts the semaphore in the superblock security struct to a mutex. No locking changes or other code changes are done. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: change isec semaphore to a mutexEric Paris2006-09-263-19/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch converts the remaining isec->sem into a mutex. Very similar locking is provided as before only in the faster smaller mutex rather than a semaphore. An out_unlock path is introduced rather than the conditional unlocking found in the original code. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: eliminate inode_security_set_securityEric Paris2006-09-261-20/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | inode_security_set_sid is only called by security_inode_init_security, which is called when a new file is being created and needs to have its incore security state initialized and its security xattr set. This helper used to be called in other places in the past, but now only has the one. So this patch rolls inode_security_set_sid directly back into security_inode_init_security. There also is no need to hold the isec->sem while doing this, as the inode is not available to other threads at this point in time. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: add support for range transitions on object classesDarrel Goeddel2006-09-265-23/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduces support for policy version 21. This version of the binary kernel policy allows for defining range transitions on security classes other than the process security class. As always, backwards compatibility for older formats is retained. The security class is read in as specified when using the new format, while the "process" security class is assumed when using an older policy format. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: enable configuration of max policy versionStephen Smalley2006-09-262-1/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enable configuration of SELinux maximum supported policy version to support legacy userland (init) that does not gracefully handle kernels that support newer policy versions two or more beyond the installed policy, as in FC3 and FC4. [bunk@stusta.de: improve Kconfig help text] Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interfaceStephen Smalley2006-09-261-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interface for consistency with other interfaces. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: rename selinux_ctxid_to_stringStephen Smalley2006-09-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Rename selinux_ctxid_to_string to selinux_sid_to_string to be consistent with other interfaces. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: eliminate selinux_task_ctxidStephen Smalley2006-09-261-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | Eliminate selinux_task_ctxid since it duplicates selinux_task_get_sid. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [NetLabel]: change the SELinux permissionsPaul Moore2006-09-251-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Change NetLabel to use the 'recvfrom' socket permission and the SECINITSID_NETMSG SELinux SID as the NetLabel base SID for incoming packets. This patch effectively makes the old, and currently unused, SELinux NETMSG permissions NetLabel permissions. Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: correct improper handling of non-NetLabel peer contextsPaul Moore2006-09-251-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a problem where NetLabel would always set the value of sk_security_struct->peer_sid in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() to the context of the socket, causing problems when users would query the context of the connection. This patch fixes this so that the value in sk_security_struct->peer_sid is only set when the connection is NetLabel based, otherwise the value is untouched. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [SELINUX]: Fix bug in security_sid_mls_copyVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | The following fixes a bug where random mem is being tampered with in the non-mls case; encountered by Jashua Brindle on a gentoo box. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [NetLabel]: add some missing #includes to various header filesPaul Moore2006-09-221-0/+9
| | | | | | | Add some missing include files to the NetLabel related header files. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: uninline selinux_netlbl_inode_permission()Paul Moore2006-09-222-43/+25
| | | | | | | | Uninline the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() at the request of Andrew Morton. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: Cleanup ebitmap_import()Paul Moore2006-09-221-20/+16
| | | | | | | Rewrite ebitmap_import() so it is a bit cleaner and easier to read. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: Comment corrections.Paul Moore2006-09-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | Fix some incorrect comments. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: Correctly initialize the NetLabel fields.Paul Moore2006-09-223-2/+67
| | | | | | | | Fix a problem where the NetLabel specific fields of the sk_security_struct structure were not being initialized early enough in some cases. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [SELINUX]: security/selinux/hooks.c: Make 4 functions static.Adrian Bunk2006-09-221-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | This patch makes four needlessly global functions static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: SELinux supportVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-229-14/+996
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code. The most significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into the following SELinux LSM hooks: * selinux_file_permission() * selinux_socket_sendmsg() * selinux_socket_post_create() * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram() * selinux_sock_graft() * selinux_inet_conn_request() The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are "NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security attributes are checked via the additional hook in selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(). NetLabel itself is only a labeling mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks. In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security (mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out of NetLabel. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Fix build with SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM disabled.Venkat Yekkirala2006-09-222-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch will fix the build problem (encountered by Andrew Morton) when SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not enabled. As compared to git-net-selinux_xfrm_decode_session-build-fix.patch in -mm, this patch sets the return parameter sid to SECSID_NULL in selinux_xfrm_decode_session() and handles this value in the caller selinux_inet_conn_request() appropriately. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Auto-labeling of child socketsVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-223-45/+117
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This automatically labels the TCP, Unix stream, and dccp child sockets as well as openreqs to be at the same MLS level as the peer. This will result in the selection of appropriately labeled IPSec Security Associations. This also uses the sock's sid (as opposed to the isec sid) in SELinux enforcement of secmark in rcv_skb and postroute_last hooks. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Default labeling of socket specific IPSec policiesVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-223-13/+26
| | | | | | | | This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the same as the socket they are set on. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Add flow labelingVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-224-25/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can be used. The following protos are currently not handled, but they should continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently do. ipmr ip_gre ipip igmp sit sctp ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device) decnet Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and stateVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-224-42/+210
| | | | | | | | | This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary SELinux enforcement pieces. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Add security sid to sockVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-223-17/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP LAST_ACK state). This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Define new SELinux service routineVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-224-20/+91
| | | | | | | | | | | This defines a routine that combines the Type Enforcement portion of one sid with the MLS portion from the other sid to arrive at a new sid. This would be used to define a sid for a security association that is to be negotiated by IKE as well as for determing the sid for open requests and connection-oriented child sockets. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Granular IPSec associations for use in MLS environmentsVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-222-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current approach to labeling Security Associations for SELinux purposes uses a one-to-one mapping between xfrm policy rules and security associations. This doesn't address the needs of real world MLS (Multi-level System, traditional Bell-LaPadula) environments where a single xfrm policy rule (pertaining to a range, classified to secret for example) might need to map to multiple Security Associations (one each for classified, secret, top secret and all the compartments applicable to these security levels). This patch set addresses the above problem by allowing for the mapping of a single xfrm policy rule to multiple security associations, with each association used in the security context it is defined for. It also includes the security context to be used in IKE negotiation in the acquire messages sent to the IKE daemon so that a unique SA can be negotiated for each unique security context. A couple of bug fixes are also included; checks to make sure the SAs used by a packet match policy (security context-wise) on the inbound and also that the bundle used for the outbound matches the security context of the flow. This patch set also makes the use of the SELinux sid in flow cache lookups seemless by including the sid in the flow key itself. Also, open requests as well as connection-oriented child sockets are labeled automatically to be at the same level as the peer to allow for use of appropriately labeled IPSec associations. Description of changes: A "sid" member has been added to the flow cache key resulting in the sid being available at all needed locations and the flow cache lookups automatically using the sid. The flow sid is derived from the socket on the outbound and the SAs (unlabeled where an SA was not used) on the inbound. Outbound case: 1. Find policy for the socket. 2. OLD: Find an SA that matches the policy. NEW: Find an SA that matches BOTH the policy and the flow/socket. This is necessary since not every SA that matches the policy can be used for the flow/socket. Consider policy range Secret-TS, and SAs each for Secret and TS. We don't want a TS socket to use the Secret SA. Hence the additional check for the SA Vs. flow/socket. 3. NEW: When looking thru bundles for a policy, make sure the flow/socket can use the bundle. If a bundle is not found, create one, calling for IKE if necessary. If using IKE, include the security context in the acquire message to the IKE daemon. Inbound case: 1. OLD: Find policy for the socket. NEW: Find policy for the incoming packet based on the sid of the SA(s) it used or the unlabeled sid if no SAs were used. (Consider a case where a socket is "authorized" for two policies (unclassified-confidential, secret-top_secret). If the packet has come in using a secret SA, we really ought to be using the latter policy (secret-top_secret).) 2. OLD: BUG: No check to see if the SAs used by the packet agree with the policy sec_ctx-wise. (It was indicated in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() that this was being accomplished by (x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) in xfrm_state_ok, but it turns out tmpl->id.spi would normally be zero (unless xfrm policy rules specify one at the template level, which they usually don't). NEW: The socket is checked for access to the SAs used (based on the sid of the SAs) in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(). Forward case: This would be Step 1 from the Inbound case, followed by Steps 2 and 3 from the Outbound case. Outstanding items/issues: - Timewait acknowledgements and such are generated in the current/upstream implementation using a NULL socket resulting in the any_socket sid (SYSTEM_HIGH) to be used. This problem is not addressed by this patch set. This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux Adds a new avperm "polmatch" to arbitrate flow/state access to a xfrm policy rule. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO] users: Use crypto_hash interface instead of crypto_digestHerbert Xu2006-09-211-8/+10
| | | | | | | This patch converts all remaining crypto_digest users to use the new crypto_hash interface. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patchCatherine Zhang2006-08-022-16/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the security context when the receiver requests it. This new design requires modification of the current unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely, secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing the security context because it is up to the security module to decide how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree operation. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] selinux: fix bug in security_compute_sidVenkat Yekkirala2006-07-311-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Initializes newcontext sooner to allow for its destruction in all cases. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: fix memory leakDarrel Goeddel2006-07-311-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes a memory leak when a policydb structure is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Fix security check for joint context= and fscontext= mount optionsEric Paris2006-07-141-5/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After some discussion on the actual meaning of the filesystem class security check in try context mount it was determined that the checks for the context= mount options were not correct if fscontext mount option had already been used. When labeling the superblock we should be checking relabel_from and relabel_to. But if the superblock has already been labeled (with fscontext) then context= is actually labeling the inodes, and so we should be checking relabel_from and associate. This patch fixes which checks are called depending on the mount options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: add rootcontext= option to label root inode when mountingEric Paris2006-07-101-9/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce a new rootcontext= option to FS mounting. This option will allow you to explicitly label the root inode of an FS being mounted before that FS or inode because visible to userspace. This was found to be useful for things like stateless linux, see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=190001 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: decouple fscontext/context mount optionsEric Paris2006-07-102-16/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the conflict between fscontext and context mount options. If context= is specified without fscontext it will operate just as before, if both are specified we will use mount point labeling and all inodes will get the label specified by context=. The superblock will be labeled with the label of fscontext=, thus affecting operations which check the superblock security context, such as associate permissions. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-04-30 18:29:43 +0000