| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| ... | |
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy
from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters
can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement.
split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check,
and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592547
If unpack_dfa() returns NULL due to the dfa not being present,
profile_unpack() is not checking if the dfa is not present (NULL).
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
While using AppArmor, SYS_CAP_RESOURCE is insufficient to call prlimit
on another task. The only other example of a AppArmor mediating access to
another, already running, task (ignoring fork+exec) is ptrace.
The AppArmor model for ptrace is that one of the following must be true:
1) The tracer is unconfined
2) The tracer is in complain mode
3) The tracer and tracee are confined by the same profile
4) The tracer is confined but has SYS_CAP_PTRACE
1), 2, and 3) are already true for setrlimit.
We can match the ptrace model just by allowing CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
We still test the values of the rlimit since it can always be overridden
using a value that means unlimited for a particular resource.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
list_next_entry has been defined in list.h, so I replace list_entry_next
with it.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
When finding a child profile via an rcu critical section, the profile
may be put and scheduled for deletion after the child is found but
before its refcount is incremented.
Protect against this by repeating the lookup if the profiles refcount
is 0 and is one its way to deletion.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
The target profile name was not being correctly audited in a few
cases because the target variable was not being set and gotos
passed the code to set it at apply:
Since it is always based on new_profile just drop the target var
and conditionally report based on new_profile.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Currently logging of a successful profile load only logs the basename
of the profile. This can result in confusion when a child profile has
the same name as the another profile in the set. Logging the hname
will ensure there is no confusion.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
currently only the profile that is causing the failure is logged. This
makes it more confusing than necessary about which profiles loaded
and which didn't. So make sure to log success and failure messages for
all profiles in the set being loaded.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Internal mounts are not mounted anywhere and as such should be treated
as disconnected paths.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Bind mounts can fail to be properly reconnected when PATH_CONNECT is
specified. Ensure that when PATH_CONNECT is specified the path has
a root.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1319984
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
The current behavior is confusing as it causes exec failures to report
the executable is missing instead of identifying that apparmor
caused the failure.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1268727
The task field in the lsm_audit struct needs to be initialized if
a change_hat fails, otherwise the following oops will occur
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000002fbead7d08
IP: [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50
PGD 1e3f35067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: pppox crc_ccitt p8023 p8022 psnap llc ax25 btrfs raid6_pq xor xfs libcrc32c dm_multipath scsi_dh kvm_amd dcdbas kvm microcode amd64_edac_mod joydev edac_core psmouse edac_mce_amd serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter mac_hid lp parport hid_generic usbhid hid pata_acpi mpt2sas ahci raid_class pata_atiixp bnx2 libahci scsi_transport_sas [last unloaded: tipc]
CPU: 2 PID: 699 Comm: changehat_twice Tainted: GF O 3.13.0-7-generic #25-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R415/08WNM9, BIOS 1.8.6 12/06/2011
task: ffff8802135c6000 ti: ffff880212986000 task.ti: ffff880212986000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8171153e>] [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50
RSP: 0018:ffff880212987b68 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000000020000 RBX: 0000002fbead7500 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000292 RSI: ffff880212987ba8 RDI: 0000002fbead7d08
RBP: ffff880212987b68 R08: 0000000000000246 R09: ffff880216e572a0
R10: ffffffff815fd677 R11: ffffea0008469580 R12: ffffffff8130966f
R13: ffff880212987ba8 R14: 0000002fbead7d08 R15: ffff8800d8c6b830
FS: 00002b5e6c84e7c0(0000) GS:ffff880216e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000055731700
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000002fbead7d08 CR3: 000000021270f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff880212987b98 ffffffff81075f17 ffffffff8130966f 0000000000000009
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880212987bd0 ffffffff81075f7c
0000000000000292 ffff880212987c08 ffff8800d8c6b800 0000000000000026
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81075f17>] __lock_task_sighand+0x47/0x80
[<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50
[<ffffffff81075f7c>] do_send_sig_info+0x2c/0x80
[<ffffffff81075fee>] send_sig_info+0x1e/0x30
[<ffffffff8130242d>] aa_audit+0x13d/0x190
[<ffffffff8130c1dc>] aa_audit_file+0xbc/0x130
[<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50
[<ffffffff81304cc2>] aa_change_hat+0x202/0x530
[<ffffffff81308fc6>] aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x116/0x1d0
[<ffffffff8130a11d>] apparmor_setprocattr+0x25d/0x300
[<ffffffff812cee56>] security_setprocattr+0x16/0x20
[<ffffffff8121fc87>] proc_pid_attr_write+0x107/0x130
[<ffffffff811b7604>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811b8039>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff8171a1bf>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
When set atomic replacement is used and the parent is updated before the
child, and the child did not exist in the old parent so there is no
direct replacement then the new child is incorrectly added to the old
parent. This results in the new parent not having the child(ren) that
it should and the old parent when being destroyed asserting the
following error.
AppArmor: policy_destroy: internal error, policy '<profile/name>' still
contains profiles
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| | |\ \ \
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
|
| | | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | | |
Strip some trailing spaces.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
| | |\ \ \ \
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
into next
|
| | | |/ / /
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | | |
Kill with signal number 0 is commonly used for checking PID existence.
Smack treated such cases like any other kills, although no signal is
actually delivered when sig == 0.
Checking permissions when sig == 0 didn't prevent an unprivileged caller
from learning whether PID exists or not. When it existed, kernel returned
EPERM, when it didn't - ESRCH. The only effect of policy check in such
case is noise in audit logs.
This change lets Smack silently ignore kill() invocations with sig == 0.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
|
| | |\ \ \ \
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
into next
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
This works in exactly the same way as the CIPSO label cache.
The idea is to allow the lsm to cache the result of a secattr
lookup so that it doesn't need to perform the lookup for
every skbuff.
It introduces two sysctl controls:
calipso_cache_enable - enables/disables the cache.
calipso_cache_bucket_size - sets the size of a cache bucket.
Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate
labelling engine. CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO
when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a
CALIPSO error handler.
Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
In some cases, the lsm needs to add the label to the skbuff directly.
A NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT IPv6 hook is added to selinux to match the IPv4
behaviour. This allows selinux to label the skbuffs that it requires.
Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
Request sockets need to have a label that takes into account the
incoming connection as well as their parent's label. This is used
for the outgoing SYN-ACK and for their child full-socket.
Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
If a socket has a netlabel in place then don't let setsockopt() alter
the socket's IPv6 hop-by-hop option. This is in the same spirit as
the existing check for IPv4.
Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
CALIPSO is a hop-by-hop IPv6 option. A lot of this patch is based on
the equivalent CISPO code. The main difference is due to manipulating
the options in the hop-by-hop header.
Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
avc_cache_threshold is of type unsigned int. Do not use a signed
new_value in sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value).
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
[PM: subject prefix fix, description cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
The existing ebitmap_netlbl_import() code didn't correctly handle the
case where the ebitmap_node was not aligned/sized to a power of two,
this patch fixes this (on x86_64 ebitmap_node contains six bitmaps
making a range of 0..383).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
The current bounds checking of both source and target types
requires allowing any domain that has access to the child
domain to also have the same permissions to the parent, which
is undesirable. Drop the target bounds checking.
KaiGai Kohei originally removed all use of target bounds in
commit 7d52a155e38d ("selinux: remove dead code in
type_attribute_bounds_av()") but this was reverted in
commit 2ae3ba39389b ("selinux: libsepol: remove dead code in
check_avtab_hierarchy_callback()") because it would have
required explicitly allowing the parent any permissions
to the child that the child is allowed to itself.
This change in contrast retains the logic for the case where both
source and target types are bounded, thereby allowing access
if the parent of the source is allowed the corresponding
permissions to the parent of the target. Further, this change
reworks the logic such that we only perform a single computation
for each case and there is no ambiguity as to how to resolve
a bounds violation.
Under the new logic, if the source type and target types are both
bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same
permissions to the parent of the target type. If only the source
type is bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed
the same permissions to the target type.
Examples of the new logic and comparisons with the old logic:
1. If we have:
typebounds A B;
then:
allow B self:process <permissions>;
will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
allow A self:process <permissions>;
is also allowed in policy.
Under the old logic, the allow rule on B satisfies the
bounds constraint if any of the following three are allowed:
allow A B:process <permissions>; or
allow B A:process <permissions>; or
allow A self:process <permissions>;
However, either of the first two ultimately require the third to
satisfy the bounds constraint under the old logic, and therefore
this degenerates to the same result (but is more efficient - we only
need to perform one compute_av call).
2. If we have:
typebounds A B;
typebounds A_exec B_exec;
then:
allow B B_exec:file <permissions>;
will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
allow A A_exec:file <permissions>;
is also allowed in policy.
This is essentially the same as #1; it is merely included as
an example of dealing with object types related to a bounded domain
in a manner that satisfies the bounds relationship. Note that
this approach is preferable to leaving B_exec unbounded and having:
allow A B_exec:file <permissions>;
in policy because that would allow B's entrypoints to be used to
enter A. Similarly for _tmp or other related types.
3. If we have:
typebounds A B;
and an unbounded type T, then:
allow B T:file <permissions>;
will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
allow A T:file <permissions>;
is allowed in policy.
The old logic would have been identical for this example.
4. If we have:
typebounds A B;
and an unbounded domain D, then:
allow D B:unix_stream_socket <permissions>;
is not subject to any bounds constraints under the new logic
because D is not bounded. This is desirable so that we can
allow a domain to e.g. connectto a child domain without having
to allow it to do the same to its parent.
The old logic would have required:
allow D A:unix_stream_socket <permissions>;
to also be allowed in policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: re-wrapped description to appease checkpatch.pl]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
Extend the PCR supplied as a parameter, instead of assuming that the
measurement entry uses the default configured PCR.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
IMA avoids re-measuring files by storing the current state as a flag in
the integrity cache. It will then skip adding a new measurement log entry
if the cache reports the file as already measured.
If a policy measures an already measured file to a new PCR, the measurement
will not be added to the list. This patch implements a new bitfield for
specifying which PCR the file was measured into, rather than if it was
measured.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
Template entry duplicates are prevented from being added to the
measurement list by checking a hash table that contains the template
entry digests. However, the PCR value is not included in this comparison,
so duplicate template entry digests with differing PCRs may be dropped.
This patch redefines duplicate template entries as template entries with
the same digest and same PCR values.
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
IMA assumes that the same default Kconfig PCR is extended for each
entry. This patch replaces the default configured PCR with the policy
defined PCR.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
The IMA measurement list entries include the Kconfig defined PCR value.
This patch defines a new ima_template_entry field for including the PCR
as specified in the policy rule.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
Different policy rules may extend different PCRs. This patch retrieves
the specific PCR for the matched rule. Subsequent patches will include
the rule specific PCR in the measurement list and extend the appropriate
PCR.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
This patch defines a new IMA measurement policy rule option "pcr=",
which allows extending different PCRs on a per rule basis. For example,
the system independent files could extend the default IMA Kconfig
specified PCR, while the system dependent files could extend a different
PCR.
The following is an example of this usage with an SELinux policy; the
rule would extend PCR 11 with system configuration files:
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ obj_type=system_conf_t pcr=11
Changelog v3:
- FIELD_SIZEOF returns bytes, not bits. Fixed INVALID_PCR
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
| | | |/ / /
| |/| | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | | |
To keep track of which measurements have been extended to which PCRs, this
patch defines a new integrity_iint_cache field named measured_pcrs. This
field is a bitmask of the PCRs measured. Each bit corresponds to a PCR
index. For example, bit 10 corresponds to PCR 10.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
| | | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | | |
The code is doing the equivalent of the kthread_run macro.
Signed-off-by: Mike Danese <mikedanese@google.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
| | | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | | |
Serge Hallyn pointed out that the current implementation of
security_inode_getsecurity() works if there is only one hook
provided for it, but will fail if there is more than one and
the attribute requested isn't supplied by the first module.
This isn't a problem today, since only SELinux and Smack
provide this hook and there is (currently) no way to enable
both of those modules at the same time. Serge, however, wants
to introduce a capability attribute and an inode_getsecurity
hook in the capability security module to handle it. This
addresses that upcoming problem, will be required for "extreme
stacking" and is just a better implementation.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
| |\ \ \ \ \
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman:
"This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the
user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems
with a backing store. The real world target is fuse but the goal is
to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported. This
patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that
goal.
While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it
became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules
that needed special treatment. That the resolution of those concerns
would not be fuse specific. That sorting out these general issues
made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be
drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for
everyone.
At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things:
- Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block.
- Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into
to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and
INVALID_GID in vfs data structures.
By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with
only user namespace privilege can be detected. This allows security
modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted. This
also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the
filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the
owning user namespace of the filesystem.
One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes
whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs. Most of the code
simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path
so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for
such inodes (aka only reads are allowed).
This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved
in user namespace permirted mounts. Then when things are clean enough
adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns. Then additional restrictions
are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock
contains owner information.
These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some
parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior.
- Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the
suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think
/proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less
privileged user.
- The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV
with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock
instead.
Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state
user invisible. The user visibility can be managed but it caused
problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably
expecting mount flags to be what they were set to.
There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support
mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond
what is in this set of changes.
- Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device
during mount.
- Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems
mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their
security xattrs accordingly.
- Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission
checks in d_automount and the like. (Given that overlayfs already
does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to
generalize this case).
Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist:
- Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix
acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and
posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed. [Maintainability]
- Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow
the superblock owner to perform them.
- Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and
gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated
normally.
I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks
until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be
locked down and handled generically.
Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up
with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more
corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my
changes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits)
fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds
fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns
evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC
dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns
quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota
quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem
vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()
fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns.
userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS
fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns
selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block
userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag
userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility.
...
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
The EVM HMAC should be calculated using the on disk user and
group ids, so the k[ug]ids in the inode must be translated
relative to the s_user_ns of the inode's super block.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
Security labels from unprivileged mounts in user namespaces must
be ignored. Force superblocks from user namespaces whose labeling
behavior is to use xattrs to use mountpoint labeling instead.
For the mountpoint label, default to converting the current task
context into a form suitable for file objects, but also allow the
policy writer to specify a different label through policy
transition rules.
Pieced together from code snippets provided by Stephen Smalley.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | | |
Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted.
Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the
filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device
passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to
determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we
settle for the label of the process doing the mount.
This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to
ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property
is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even
though it is technically not necessary.
If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is
permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access
is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored.
Explicit setting of security labels continues to require
CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns.
Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not
accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing
store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem
which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an
unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges.
sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user
namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the
possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts
from user namespaces with security lables set from the init
namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may
introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these
filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the
backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an
explicit exception is made to trust labels from these
filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
