From 57e734423adda83f3b05505875343284efe3b39c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tobin C. Harding" Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2017 10:56:39 +1100 Subject: vsprintf: refactor %pK code out of pointer() Currently code to handle %pK is all within the switch statement in pointer(). This is the wrong level of abstraction. Each of the other switch clauses call a helper function, pK should do the same. Refactor code out of pointer() to new function restricted_pointer(). Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding --- lib/vsprintf.c | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/vsprintf.c') diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index 1746bae94d416..8dc5cf85cef47 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -1343,6 +1343,59 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr, return string(buf, end, uuid, spec); } +int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; + +static noinline_for_stack +char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, + struct printf_spec spec) +{ + spec.base = 16; + spec.flags |= SMALL; + if (spec.field_width == -1) { + spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); + spec.flags |= ZEROPAD; + } + + switch (kptr_restrict) { + case 0: + /* Always print %pK values */ + break; + case 1: { + const struct cred *cred; + + /* + * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context + * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. + */ + if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) + return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec); + + /* + * Only print the real pointer value if the current + * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the + * same credentials it started with. This is because + * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK + * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to + * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using + * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it. + */ + cred = current_cred(); + if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) || + !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || + !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)) + ptr = NULL; + break; + } + case 2: + default: + /* Always print 0's for %pK */ + ptr = NULL; + break; + } + + return number(buf, end, (unsigned long)ptr, spec); +} + static noinline_for_stack char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr, const char *fmt) { @@ -1591,8 +1644,6 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn, return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); } -int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; - /* * Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed * by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format @@ -1792,47 +1843,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, return buf; } case 'K': - switch (kptr_restrict) { - case 0: - /* Always print %pK values */ - break; - case 1: { - const struct cred *cred; - - /* - * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context - * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. - */ - if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) { - if (spec.field_width == -1) - spec.field_width = default_width; - return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec); - } - - /* - * Only print the real pointer value if the current - * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the - * same credentials it started with. This is because - * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK - * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to - * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using - * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it. - */ - cred = current_cred(); - if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) || - !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || - !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)) - ptr = NULL; - break; - } - case 2: - default: - /* Always print 0's for %pK */ - ptr = NULL; - break; - } - break; - + return restricted_pointer(buf, end, ptr, spec); case 'N': return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, fmt); case 'a': -- cgit v1.2.3