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authorTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>2021-10-12 09:56:13 -0700
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2021-10-14 20:48:04 -0400
commit52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe (patch)
treeb3b18e0e5162c6f0b1f0aeef6870249e800c2d4a /drivers/android
parent29bc22ac5e5bc63275e850f0c8fc549e3d0e306b (diff)
downloadlinux-52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe.tar.gz
linux-52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe.tar.xz
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks
Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/android')
-rw-r--r--drivers/android/binder.c12
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 231cff9b3b75..1571e01cfa52 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2047,7 +2047,7 @@ static int binder_translate_binder(struct flat_binder_object *fp,
ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
- if (security_binder_transfer_binder(proc->tsk, target_proc->tsk)) {
+ if (security_binder_transfer_binder(proc->cred, target_proc->cred)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto done;
}
@@ -2093,7 +2093,7 @@ static int binder_translate_handle(struct flat_binder_object *fp,
proc->pid, thread->pid, fp->handle);
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (security_binder_transfer_binder(proc->tsk, target_proc->tsk)) {
+ if (security_binder_transfer_binder(proc->cred, target_proc->cred)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto done;
}
@@ -2181,7 +2181,7 @@ static int binder_translate_fd(u32 fd, binder_size_t fd_offset,
ret = -EBADF;
goto err_fget;
}
- ret = security_binder_transfer_file(proc->tsk, target_proc->tsk, file);
+ ret = security_binder_transfer_file(proc->cred, target_proc->cred, file);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto err_security;
@@ -2586,8 +2586,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_invalid_target_handle;
}
- if (security_binder_transaction(proc->tsk,
- target_proc->tsk) < 0) {
+ if (security_binder_transaction(proc->cred,
+ target_proc->cred) < 0) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = -EPERM;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
@@ -4555,7 +4555,7 @@ static int binder_ioctl_set_ctx_mgr(struct file *filp,
ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
- ret = security_binder_set_context_mgr(proc->tsk);
+ ret = security_binder_set_context_mgr(proc->cred);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (uid_valid(context->binder_context_mgr_uid)) {