Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this release:

   - PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells
   - appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer
   - bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits)
  X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs
  netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions
  netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions
  netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit
  PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
  tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier
  tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts
  tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random()
  tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path
  tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver
  PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()"
  X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments
  PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning
  KEYS: revert encrypted key change
  ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
  firmware_class: perform new LSM checks
  security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
  PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h
  ...

18 files changed, 2075 insertions, 50 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 03a6eb95ab500..4870f28403f54 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
 
 config PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
 	tristate "RSA public-key algorithm"
-	select MPILIB_EXTRA
 	select MPILIB
 	help
 	  This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447).
@@ -33,8 +32,39 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
 	select ASN1
 	select OID_REGISTRY
 	help
-	  This option procides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key
+	  This option provides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key
 	  data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
 	  public key packet found inside the certificate.
 
+config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+	tristate "PKCS#7 message parser"
+	depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	select ASN1
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	help
+	  This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for
+	  signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature.
+
+config PKCS7_TEST_KEY
+	tristate "PKCS#7 testing key type"
+	depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+	select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	help
+	  This option provides a type of key that can be loaded up from a
+	  PKCS#7 message - provided the message is signed by a trusted key.  If
+	  it is, the PKCS#7 wrapper is discarded and reading the key returns
+	  just the payload.  If it isn't, adding the key will fail with an
+	  error.
+
+	  This is intended for testing the PKCS#7 parser.
+
+config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+	bool "Support for PE file signature verification"
+	depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
+	select ASN1
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	help
+	  This option provides support for verifying the signature(s) on a
+	  signed PE binary.
+
 endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index 0727204aab683..e47fcd9ac5e86 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -25,3 +25,40 @@ $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
 
 clean-files	+= x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h
 clean-files	+= x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#7 message handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o
+pkcs7_message-y := \
+	pkcs7-asn1.o \
+	pkcs7_parser.o \
+	pkcs7_trust.o \
+	pkcs7_verify.o
+
+$(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
+$(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
+
+clean-files	+= pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#7 parser testing key
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY) += pkcs7_test_key.o
+pkcs7_test_key-y := \
+	pkcs7_key_type.o
+
+#
+# Signed PE binary-wrapped key handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION) += verify_signed_pefile.o
+
+verify_signed_pefile-y := \
+	verify_pefile.o \
+	mscode_parser.o \
+	mscode-asn1.o
+
+$(obj)/mscode_parser.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h
+$(obj)/mscode-asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.c $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h
+
+clean-files	+= mscode-asn1.c mscode-asn1.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
index 515b634308121..a63c551c65570 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
  */
 
+int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
+
 static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
 {
 	return key->type_data.p[1];
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index b77eb53047882..eb8cd46961a5a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -23,6 +23,35 @@ static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
 
 /*
+ * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
+ * @id:		key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
+ */
+int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
+{
+	size_t idlen, kidlen;
+
+	if (!kid || !id)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
+	if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
+		id += 3;
+
+	/* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
+	idlen = strlen(id);
+	kidlen = strlen(kid);
+	if (idlen > kidlen)
+		return 0;
+
+	kid += kidlen - idlen;
+	if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
+
+/*
  * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
  * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys.  We allow:
  *
@@ -34,9 +63,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
 {
 	const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
 	const char *spec = description;
-	const char *id, *kid;
+	const char *id;
 	ptrdiff_t speclen;
-	size_t idlen, kidlen;
 
 	if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
 		return 0;
@@ -55,23 +83,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
 	speclen = id - spec;
 	id++;
 
-	/* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
-	kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
-	if (!kid)
-		return 0;
-
-	idlen = strlen(id);
-	kidlen = strlen(kid);
-	if (idlen > kidlen)
-		return 0;
-
-	kid += kidlen - idlen;
-	if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (speclen == 2 &&
-	    memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
-		return 1;
+	if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
+		return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
 
 	if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
 	    memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
@@ -156,7 +169,7 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
 
 	if (subtype) {
-		subtype->destroy(prep->payload);
+		subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
 		module_put(subtype->owner);
 	}
 	kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
@@ -164,29 +177,6 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 }
 
 /*
- * Instantiate a asymmetric_key defined key.  The key was preparsed, so we just
- * have to transfer the data here.
- */
-static int asymmetric_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
-
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen);
-	if (ret == 0) {
-		key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0];
-		key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1];
-		key->payload.data = prep->payload;
-		prep->type_data[0] = NULL;
-		prep->type_data[1] = NULL;
-		prep->payload = NULL;
-	}
-	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
  * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a asymmetric key
  */
 static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
@@ -205,7 +195,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
 	.name		= "asymmetric",
 	.preparse	= asymmetric_key_preparse,
 	.free_preparse	= asymmetric_key_free_preparse,
-	.instantiate	= asymmetric_key_instantiate,
+	.instantiate	= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.match		= asymmetric_key_match,
 	.destroy	= asymmetric_key_destroy,
 	.describe	= asymmetric_key_describe,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..6d09ba48c41cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+--- Microsoft individual code signing data blob parser
+---
+--- Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+--- Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+---
+--- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+--- modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+--- as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+--- 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+---
+
+MSCode ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type			SEQUENCE {
+		contentType	ContentType,
+		parameters	ANY
+	},
+	content			SEQUENCE {
+		digestAlgorithm	DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+		digest		OCTET STRING ({ mscode_note_digest })
+	}
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_content_type })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_digest_algo }),
+	parameters  ANY OPTIONAL
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..214a992123cdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/* Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MSCODE: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include "verify_pefile.h"
+#include "mscode-asn1.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ */
+int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	const void *content_data;
+	size_t data_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx->pkcs7, &content_data, &data_len, 1);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_debug("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n", data_len, (unsigned)(data_len),
+		 content_data);
+
+	return asn1_ber_decoder(&mscode_decoder, ctx, content_data, data_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the content type OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	enum OID oid;
+
+	oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	if (oid == OID__NR) {
+		char buffer[50];
+
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * pesign utility had a bug where it was putting
+	 * OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId
+	 * So allow both OIDs.
+	 */
+	if (oid != OID_msPeImageDataObjId &&
+	    oid != OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose) {
+		pr_err("Unexpected content type OID %u\n", oid);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			    unsigned char tag,
+			    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+	char buffer[50];
+	enum OID oid;
+
+	oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	switch (oid) {
+	case OID_md4:
+		ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4;
+		break;
+	case OID_md5:
+		ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		break;
+	case OID_sha1:
+		ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		break;
+	case OID_sha256:
+		ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
+		break;
+
+	case OID__NR:
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	default:
+		pr_err("Unsupported content type: %u\n", oid);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest we're guaranteeing with this certificate
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		       unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->digest = value;
+	ctx->digest_len = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..a5a14ef28c869
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	contentType	ContentType,
+	content		[0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
+
+SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+	version			INTEGER,
+	digestAlgorithms	DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+	contentInfo		ContentInfo,
+	certificates		CHOICE {
+		certSet		[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates,
+		certSequence	[2] IMPLICIT Certificates
+	} OPTIONAL ({ pkcs7_note_certificate_list }),
+	crls CHOICE {
+		crlSet		[1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists,
+		crlSequence	[3] IMPLICIT CRLSequence
+	} OPTIONAL,
+	signerInfos		SignerInfos
+}
+
+ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	contentType	ContentType,
+	content		[0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL
+}
+
+Data ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_note_data })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= CHOICE {
+	daSet			SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+	daSequence		SEQUENCE OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
+}
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	parameters  ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+--
+-- Certificates and certificate lists
+--
+ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates ::= SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate
+
+ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE {
+  certificate		Certificate,				-- X.509
+  extendedCertificate	[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate	-- PKCS#6
+}
+
+ExtendedCertificate ::= Certificate -- cheating
+
+Certificates ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
+
+CertificateRevocationLists ::= SET OF CertificateList
+
+CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- This may be defined incorrectly
+
+CRLSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
+
+Certificate ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_extract_cert }) -- X.509
+
+--
+-- Signer information
+--
+SignerInfos ::= CHOICE {
+	siSet		SET OF SignerInfo,
+	siSequence	SEQUENCE OF SignerInfo
+}
+
+SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	version			INTEGER,
+	issuerAndSerialNumber	IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+	digestAlgorithm		DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo }),
+	authenticatedAttributes	CHOICE {
+		aaSet		[0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute
+					({ pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs }),
+		aaSequence	[2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+			-- Explicit because easier to compute digest on
+			-- sequence of attributes and then reuse encoded
+			-- sequence in aaSequence.
+	} OPTIONAL,
+	digestEncryptionAlgorithm
+				DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo }),
+	encryptedDigest		EncryptedDigest,
+	unauthenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
+		uaSet		[1] IMPLICIT SET OF UnauthenticatedAttribute,
+		uaSequence	[3] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF UnauthenticatedAttribute
+	} OPTIONAL
+} ({ pkcs7_note_signed_info })
+
+IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
+	issuer			Name ({ pkcs7_sig_note_issuer }),
+	serialNumber		CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_sig_note_serial })
+}
+
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+
+SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+
+AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	values			SET OF ANY ({ pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr })
+}
+
+UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	values			SET OF ANY
+}
+
+DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	parameters		ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_signature })
+
+---
+--- X.500 Name
+---
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+	attributeType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	attributeValue		ANY
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..3de5fb011de0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/* Testing module to load key from trusted PKCS#7 message
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7key: "fmt
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+	const void *data, *saved_prep_data;
+	size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen;
+	bool trusted;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	saved_prep_data = prep->data;
+	saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
+	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen);
+	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_free;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_free;
+	if (!trusted)
+		pr_warn("PKCS#7 message doesn't chain back to a trusted key\n");
+
+	ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_free;
+
+	prep->data = data;
+	prep->datalen = datalen;
+	ret = user_preparse(prep);
+	prep->data = saved_prep_data;
+	prep->datalen = saved_prep_datalen;
+
+error_free:
+	pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
+error:
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
+ * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
+ */
+static struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = {
+	.name			= "pkcs7_test",
+	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+	.preparse		= pkcs7_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= user_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.match			= user_match,
+	.revoke			= user_revoke,
+	.destroy		= user_destroy,
+	.describe		= user_describe,
+	.read			= user_read,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module stuff
+ */
+static int __init pkcs7_key_init(void)
+{
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7);
+}
+
+static void __exit pkcs7_key_cleanup(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7);
+}
+
+module_init(pkcs7_key_init);
+module_exit(pkcs7_key_cleanup);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..42e56aa7d277e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+/* PKCS#7 parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+#include "pkcs7-asn1.h"
+
+struct pkcs7_parse_context {
+	struct pkcs7_message	*msg;		/* Message being constructed */
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;	/* SignedInfo being constructed */
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info **ppsinfo;
+	struct x509_certificate *certs;		/* Certificate cache */
+	struct x509_certificate **ppcerts;
+	unsigned long	data;			/* Start of data */
+	enum OID	last_oid;		/* Last OID encountered */
+	unsigned	x509_index;
+	unsigned	sinfo_index;
+};
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_free_message - Free a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to free
+ */
+void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *cert;
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+
+	if (pkcs7) {
+		while (pkcs7->certs) {
+			cert = pkcs7->certs;
+			pkcs7->certs = cert->next;
+			x509_free_certificate(cert);
+		}
+		while (pkcs7->crl) {
+			cert = pkcs7->crl;
+			pkcs7->crl = cert->next;
+			x509_free_certificate(cert);
+		}
+		while (pkcs7->signed_infos) {
+			sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+			pkcs7->signed_infos = sinfo->next;
+			mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+			kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
+			kfree(sinfo);
+		}
+		kfree(pkcs7);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_parse_message - Parse a PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The raw binary ASN.1 encoded message to be parsed
+ * @datalen: The size of the encoded message
+ */
+struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx;
+	struct pkcs7_message *msg;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!msg)
+		goto error_no_sig;
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		goto error_no_ctx;
+	ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo)
+		goto error_no_sinfo;
+
+	ctx->msg = msg;
+	ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
+	ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+	ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->msg->signed_infos;
+
+	/* Attempt to decode the signature */
+	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_decode;
+
+	while (ctx->certs) {
+		struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs;
+		ctx->certs = cert->next;
+		x509_free_certificate(cert);
+	}
+	mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+	kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest);
+	kfree(ctx->sinfo);
+	kfree(ctx);
+	return msg;
+
+error_decode:
+	mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+	kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest);
+	kfree(ctx->sinfo);
+error_no_sinfo:
+	kfree(ctx);
+error_no_ctx:
+	pkcs7_free_message(msg);
+error_no_sig:
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_get_content_data - Get access to the PKCS#7 content
+ * @pkcs7: The preparsed PKCS#7 message to access
+ * @_data: Place to return a pointer to the data
+ * @_data_len: Place to return the data length
+ * @want_wrapper: True if the ASN.1 object header should be included in the data
+ *
+ * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message, including, optionally,
+ * the header of the ASN.1 object that contains it.  Returns -ENODATA if the
+ * data object was missing from the message.
+ */
+int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			   const void **_data, size_t *_data_len,
+			   bool want_wrapper)
+{
+	size_t wrapper;
+
+	if (!pkcs7->data)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	wrapper = want_wrapper ? pkcs7->data_hdrlen : 0;
+	*_data = pkcs7->data - wrapper;
+	*_data_len = pkcs7->data_len + wrapper;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_get_content_data);
+
+/*
+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
+ * to interpret it.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		   unsigned char tag,
+		   const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
+		char buffer[50];
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		printk("PKCS7: Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
+		       (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			       unsigned char tag,
+			       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_md4:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4;
+		break;
+	case OID_md5:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		break;
+	case OID_sha1:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		break;
+	case OID_sha256:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the public key algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_rsaEncryption:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract a certificate and store it in the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		       unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509;
+
+	if (tag != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) {
+		pr_debug("Cert began with tag %02x at %lu\n",
+			 tag, (unsigned long)ctx - ctx->data);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	/* We have to correct for the header so that the X.509 parser can start
+	 * from the beginning.  Note that since X.509 stipulates DER, there
+	 * probably shouldn't be an EOC trailer - but it is in PKCS#7 (which
+	 * stipulates BER).
+	 */
+	value -= hdrlen;
+	vlen += hdrlen;
+
+	if (((u8*)value)[1] == 0x80)
+		vlen += 2; /* Indefinite length - there should be an EOC */
+
+	x509 = x509_cert_parse(value, vlen);
+	if (IS_ERR(x509))
+		return PTR_ERR(x509);
+
+	pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
+	pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
+
+	x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
+	*ctx->ppcerts = x509;
+	ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the certificate list
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_certificate_list(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				unsigned char tag,
+				const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_devel("Got cert list (%02x)\n", tag);
+
+	*ctx->ppcerts = ctx->msg->certs;
+	ctx->msg->certs = ctx->certs;
+	ctx->certs = NULL;
+	ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the data from the message and store that and its content type OID in
+ * the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		    unsigned char tag,
+		    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_debug("Got data\n");
+
+	ctx->msg->data = value;
+	ctx->msg->data_len = vlen;
+	ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen;
+	ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse authenticated attributes
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				      unsigned char tag,
+				      const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_messageDigest:
+		if (tag != ASN1_OTS)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		ctx->sinfo->msgdigest = value;
+		ctx->sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 9.3]
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				    unsigned char tag,
+				    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	/* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
+	ctx->sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
+	ctx->sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuing certificate serial number
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			  unsigned char tag,
+			  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
+	ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuer's name
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			  unsigned char tag,
+			  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
+	ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the signature data
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	MPI mpi;
+
+	BUG_ON(ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA);
+
+	mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen);
+	if (!mpi)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0] = mpi;
+	ctx->sinfo->sig.nr_mpi = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a signature information block
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			   unsigned char tag,
+			   const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
+	*ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+	ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
+	ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..d25f4d15370ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser internal definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+	pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+	pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+struct pkcs7_signed_info {
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
+	struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
+	unsigned index;
+	bool trusted;
+
+	/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
+	const void	*msgdigest;
+	unsigned	msgdigest_len;
+
+	/* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */
+	unsigned	authattrs_len;
+	const void	*authattrs;
+
+	/* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
+	const void	*raw_serial;
+	unsigned	raw_serial_size;
+	unsigned	raw_issuer_size;
+	const void	*raw_issuer;
+
+	/* Message signature.
+	 *
+	 * This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or
+	 * the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3].  If the latter, one of
+	 * the attributes contains the digest of the the Content Data within
+	 * it.
+	 */
+	struct public_key_signature sig;
+};
+
+struct pkcs7_message {
+	struct x509_certificate *certs;	/* Certificate list */
+	struct x509_certificate *crl;	/* Revocation list */
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos;
+
+	/* Content Data (or NULL) */
+	enum OID	data_type;	/* Type of Data */
+	size_t		data_len;	/* Length of Data */
+	size_t		data_hdrlen;	/* Length of Data ASN.1 header */
+	const void	*data;		/* Content Data (or 0) */
+};
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..e666eb011a85f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/* Validate the trust chain of a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/**
+ * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
+ */
+int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			     struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
+			     struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
+	struct key *key;
+	bool trusted;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
+
+	for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
+		if (x509->seen) {
+			if (x509->verified) {
+				trusted = x509->trusted;
+				goto verified;
+			}
+			kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]");
+			return -ENOKEY;
+		}
+		x509->seen = true;
+
+		/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
+		 * keys.
+		 */
+		key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject,
+						  x509->fingerprint);
+		if (!IS_ERR(key))
+			/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
+			 * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
+			 * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate
+			 * the signature on the descendant.
+			 */
+			goto matched;
+		if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		 /* Self-signed certificates form roots of their own, and if we
+		  * don't know them, then we can't accept them.
+		  */
+		if (x509->next == x509) {
+			kleave(" = -ENOKEY [unknown self-signed]");
+			return -ENOKEY;
+		}
+
+		might_sleep();
+		last = x509;
+		sig = &last->sig;
+	}
+
+	/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
+	 * trusted keys.
+	 */
+	if (!last || !last->issuer || !last->authority) {
+		kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]");
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	}
+
+	key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer,
+					  last->authority);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
+	x509 = last;
+
+matched:
+	ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+	trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags);
+	key_put(key);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+			return ret;
+		kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [verify %d]", ret);
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+verified:
+	x509->verified = true;
+	for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
+		p->verified = true;
+		p->trusted = trusted;
+	}
+	sinfo->trusted = trusted;
+	kleave(" = 0");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
+ * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
+ * keys we already know and trust.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
+ *	key, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
+ *	keyring, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
+ *	chain.
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
+ *	the message.
+ *
+ * May also return -ENOMEM.
+ */
+int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			 struct key *trust_keyring,
+			 bool *_trusted)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+	struct x509_certificate *p;
+	int cached_ret = 0, ret;
+
+	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+		p->seen = false;
+
+	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
+		ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+				cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
+			} else if (ret == -ENOKEY) {
+				if (cached_ret == 0)
+					cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
+			} else {
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
+		*_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
+	}
+
+	return cached_ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..c62cf8006e1f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+/* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
+ */
+static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	void *digest;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u,%u", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo);
+
+	if (sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
+	    !hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo])
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+	 * big the hash operational data will be.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo],
+				 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	sinfo->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc = digest + digest_size;
+	desc->tfm   = tfm;
+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+	/* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+	pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+
+	/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
+	 * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
+	 * digest we just calculated.
+	 */
+	if (sinfo->msgdigest) {
+		u8 tag;
+
+		if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
+			pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
+				 sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
+			ret = -EBADMSG;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		if (memcmp(digest, sinfo->msgdigest, sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
+			pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
+				 sinfo->index);
+			ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		/* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
+		 * as the contents of the digest instead.  Note that we need to
+		 * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
+		 * hash it.
+		 */
+		memset(digest, 0, sinfo->sig.digest_size);
+
+		ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
+					 sinfo->authattrs_len, digest);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+	}
+
+	sinfo->sig.digest = digest;
+	digest = NULL;
+
+error:
+	kfree(digest);
+error_no_desc:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message.  PKCS#7
+ * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
+ * matching purposes.  These must match the certificate issuer's name (not
+ * subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7].
+ */
+static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *x509;
+	unsigned certix = 1;
+
+	kenter("%u,%u,%u",
+	       sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
+
+	for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
+		/* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
+		 * encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the
+		 * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that.  It's
+		 * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
+		 */
+		if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
+		    memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
+			   sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
+			continue;
+		pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
+			 sinfo->index, certix);
+
+		if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
+		    memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
+			   sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		sinfo->signer = x509;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
+		sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
+	return -ENOKEY;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the internal certificate chain as best we can.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+		p->seen = false;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
+		x509->seen = true;
+		ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
+		if (x509->authority)
+			pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
+
+		if (!x509->authority ||
+		    strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
+			/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
+			 * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
+			 * of the chain.  Likewise if the cert is its own
+			 * authority.
+			 */
+			pr_debug("- no auth?\n");
+			if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size ||
+			    memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+				   x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
+				return 0;
+
+			ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+			x509->signer = x509;
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
+		 * list to see if the next one is there.
+		 */
+		pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
+		for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+			pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
+			if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
+			    strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
+			    memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+				   x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
+				goto found_issuer;
+		}
+
+		/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
+		pr_debug("- top\n");
+		return 0;
+
+	found_issuer:
+		pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
+		if (p->seen) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		x509->signer = p;
+		if (x509 == p) {
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		x509 = p;
+		might_sleep();
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify one signed information block from a PKCS#7 message.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			    struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u", sinfo->index);
+
+	/* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message and the
+	 * signed information block
+	 */
+	ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Find the key for the signature */
+	ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
+		 sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+
+	/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	pr_devel("Verified signature %u\n", sinfo->index);
+
+	/* Verify the internal certificate chain */
+	return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7, sinfo);
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ */
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509;
+	int ret, n;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
+		ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
+	}
+
+	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
+		ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			kleave(" = %d", ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	kleave(" = 0");
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..79175e6ea0b28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+/* Parse a signed PE binary
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PEFILE: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/pe.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "verify_pefile.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PE binary.
+ */
+static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+			       struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	const struct mz_hdr *mz = pebuf;
+	const struct pe_hdr *pe;
+	const struct pe32_opt_hdr *pe32;
+	const struct pe32plus_opt_hdr *pe64;
+	const struct data_directory *ddir;
+	const struct data_dirent *dde;
+	const struct section_header *secs, *sec;
+	size_t cursor, datalen = pelen;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+#define chkaddr(base, x, s)						\
+	do {								\
+		if ((x) < base || (s) >= datalen || (x) > datalen - (s)) \
+			return -ELIBBAD;				\
+	} while (0)
+
+	chkaddr(0, 0, sizeof(*mz));
+	if (mz->magic != MZ_MAGIC)
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	cursor = sizeof(*mz);
+
+	chkaddr(cursor, mz->peaddr, sizeof(*pe));
+	pe = pebuf + mz->peaddr;
+	if (pe->magic != PE_MAGIC)
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	cursor = mz->peaddr + sizeof(*pe);
+
+	chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(pe32->magic));
+	pe32 = pebuf + cursor;
+	pe64 = pebuf + cursor;
+
+	switch (pe32->magic) {
+	case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32:
+		chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe32));
+		ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+			(unsigned long)&pe32->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+		ctx->header_size = pe32->header_size;
+		cursor += sizeof(*pe32);
+		ctx->n_data_dirents = pe32->data_dirs;
+		break;
+
+	case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS:
+		chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe64));
+		ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+			(unsigned long)&pe64->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+		ctx->header_size = pe64->header_size;
+		cursor += sizeof(*pe64);
+		ctx->n_data_dirents = pe64->data_dirs;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		pr_debug("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic);
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("checksum @ %x\n", ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+	pr_debug("header size = %x\n", ctx->header_size);
+
+	if (cursor >= ctx->header_size || ctx->header_size >= datalen)
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+
+	if (ctx->n_data_dirents > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*dde))
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+
+	ddir = pebuf + cursor;
+	cursor += sizeof(*dde) * ctx->n_data_dirents;
+
+	ctx->cert_dirent_offset =
+		(unsigned long)&ddir->certs - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+	ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size;
+
+	if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
+		pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address,
+		ddir->certs.size);
+	ctx->sig_offset = ddir->certs.virtual_address;
+	ctx->sig_len = ddir->certs.size;
+	pr_debug("cert = %x @%x [%*ph]\n",
+		 ctx->sig_len, ctx->sig_offset,
+		 ctx->sig_len, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset);
+
+	ctx->n_sections = pe->sections;
+	if (ctx->n_sections > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*sec))
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	ctx->secs = secs = pebuf + cursor;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check and strip the PE wrapper from around the signature and check that the
+ * remnant looks something like PKCS#7.
+ */
+static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
+				    struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct win_certificate wrapper;
+	const u8 *pkcs7;
+
+	if (ctx->sig_len < sizeof(wrapper)) {
+		pr_debug("Signature wrapper too short\n");
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(&wrapper, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset, sizeof(wrapper));
+	pr_debug("sig wrapper = { %x, %x, %x }\n",
+		 wrapper.length, wrapper.revision, wrapper.cert_type);
+
+	/* Both pesign and sbsign round up the length of certificate table
+	 * (in optional header data directories) to 8 byte alignment.
+	 */
+	if (round_up(wrapper.length, 8) != ctx->sig_len) {
+		pr_debug("Signature wrapper len wrong\n");
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	}
+	if (wrapper.revision != WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0) {
+		pr_debug("Signature is not revision 2.0\n");
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+	}
+	if (wrapper.cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
+		pr_debug("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n");
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	/* Looks like actual pkcs signature length is in wrapper->length.
+	 * size obtained from data dir entries lists the total size of
+	 * certificate table which is also aligned to octawrod boundary.
+	 *
+	 * So set signature length field appropriately.
+	 */
+	ctx->sig_len = wrapper.length;
+	ctx->sig_offset += sizeof(wrapper);
+	ctx->sig_len -= sizeof(wrapper);
+	if (ctx->sig_len == 0) {
+		pr_debug("Signature data missing\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	/* What's left should a PKCS#7 cert */
+	pkcs7 = pebuf + ctx->sig_offset;
+	if (pkcs7[0] == (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) {
+		if (pkcs7[1] == 0x82 &&
+		    pkcs7[2] == (((ctx->sig_len - 4) >> 8) & 0xff) &&
+		    pkcs7[3] ==  ((ctx->sig_len - 4)       & 0xff))
+			return 0;
+		if (pkcs7[1] == 0x80)
+			return 0;
+		if (pkcs7[1] > 0x82)
+			return -EMSGSIZE;
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("Signature data not PKCS#7\n");
+	return -ELIBBAD;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two sections for canonicalisation.
+ */
+static int pefile_compare_shdrs(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+	const struct section_header *shdra = a;
+	const struct section_header *shdrb = b;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (shdra->data_addr > shdrb->data_addr)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->data_addr > shdra->data_addr)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (shdra->virtual_address > shdrb->virtual_address)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->virtual_address > shdra->virtual_address)
+		return -1;
+
+	rc = strcmp(shdra->name, shdrb->name);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (shdra->virtual_size > shdrb->virtual_size)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->virtual_size > shdra->virtual_size)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (shdra->raw_data_size > shdrb->raw_data_size)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->raw_data_size > shdra->raw_data_size)
+		return -1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the contents of the PE binary into the digest, leaving out the image
+ * checksum and the certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe_contents(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+				     struct pefile_context *ctx,
+				     struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	unsigned *canon, tmp, loop, i, hashed_bytes;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Digest the header and data directory, but leave out the image
+	 * checksum and the data dirent for the signature.
+	 */
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf, ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	tmp = ctx->image_checksum_offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp,
+				  ctx->cert_dirent_offset - tmp);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	tmp = ctx->cert_dirent_offset + sizeof(struct data_dirent);
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp, ctx->header_size - tmp);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	canon = kcalloc(ctx->n_sections, sizeof(unsigned), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!canon)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* We have to canonicalise the section table, so we perform an
+	 * insertion sort.
+	 */
+	canon[0] = 0;
+	for (loop = 1; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < loop; i++) {
+			if (pefile_compare_shdrs(&ctx->secs[canon[i]],
+						 &ctx->secs[loop]) > 0) {
+				memmove(&canon[i + 1], &canon[i],
+					(loop - i) * sizeof(canon[0]));
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		canon[i] = loop;
+	}
+
+	hashed_bytes = ctx->header_size;
+	for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+		i = canon[loop];
+		if (ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size == 0)
+			continue;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+					  pebuf + ctx->secs[i].data_addr,
+					  ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			kfree(canon);
+			return ret;
+		}
+		hashed_bytes += ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size;
+	}
+	kfree(canon);
+
+	if (pelen > hashed_bytes) {
+		tmp = hashed_bytes + ctx->certs_size;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+					  pebuf + hashed_bytes,
+					  pelen - tmp);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest the contents of the PE binary, leaving out the image checksum and the
+ * certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+			    struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	void *digest;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u", ctx->digest_algo);
+
+	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+	 * big the hash operational data will be.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ctx->digest_algo], 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) {
+		pr_debug("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
+			 digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
+		ret = -EBADMSG;
+		goto error_no_desc;
+	}
+	pr_debug("Digest: desc=%zu size=%zu\n", desc_size, digest_size);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	desc = kzalloc(desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc->tfm   = tfm;
+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = pefile_digest_pe_contents(pebuf, pelen, ctx, desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	digest = (void *)desc + desc_size;
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	pr_debug("Digest calc = [%*ph]\n", ctx->digest_len, digest);
+
+	/* Check that the PE file digest matches that in the MSCODE part of the
+	 * PKCS#7 certificate.
+	 */
+	if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) {
+		pr_debug("Digest mismatch\n");
+		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+	} else {
+		pr_debug("The digests match!\n");
+	}
+
+error:
+	kfree(desc);
+error_no_desc:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image
+ * @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
+ * @pelen: Length of the binary image
+ * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
+ * binary image intersects keys we already know and trust.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ELIBBAD if the image cannot be parsed, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
+ *	key, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
+ *	keyring, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
+ *	chain.
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
+ *	the message.
+ *
+ * May also return -ENOMEM.
+ */
+int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
+			    struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+	struct pefile_context ctx;
+	const void *data;
+	size_t datalen;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ret = pefile_parse_binary(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(pebuf, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+		return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+	ctx.pkcs7 = pkcs7;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx.pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
+	if (ret < 0 || datalen == 0) {
+		pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
+		ret = -EBADMSG;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	ret = mscode_parse(&ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	pr_debug("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n",
+		 ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest);
+
+	/* Generate the digest and check against the PKCS7 certificate
+	 * contents.
+	 */
+	ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keyring, _trusted);
+
+error:
+	pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..55d5f7ebc45a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/* PE Binary parser bits
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/verify_pefile.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
+struct pefile_context {
+	unsigned	header_size;
+	unsigned	image_checksum_offset;
+	unsigned	cert_dirent_offset;
+	unsigned	n_data_dirents;
+	unsigned	n_sections;
+	unsigned	certs_size;
+	unsigned	sig_offset;
+	unsigned	sig_len;
+	const struct section_header *secs;
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+
+	/* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */
+	const void	*digest;		/* Digest */
+	unsigned	digest_len;		/* Digest length */
+	enum hash_algo	digest_algo;		/* Digest algorithm */
+};
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...)					\
+	pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+	pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+/*
+ * mscode_parser.c
+ */
+extern int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
index bf32b3dff088c..aae0cde414e2d 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
 
 TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
 	version           [ 0 ]	Version DEFAULT,
-	serialNumber		CertificateSerialNumber,
+	serialNumber		CertificateSerialNumber ({ x509_note_serial }),
 	signature		AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_pkey_algo }),
 	issuer			Name ({ x509_note_issuer }),
 	validity		Validity,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 29893162497ca..ac72348c186ae 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 		kfree(cert);
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
 
 /*
  * Parse an X.509 certificate
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ error_no_ctx:
 error_no_cert:
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse);
 
 /*
  * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
@@ -211,6 +214,19 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 }
 
 /*
+ * Note the certificate serial number
+ */
+int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		     unsigned char tag,
+		     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->cert->raw_serial = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name.
  */
 int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -322,6 +338,8 @@ int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		     const void *value, size_t vlen)
 {
 	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
 	return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);
 }
 
@@ -330,6 +348,8 @@ int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		      const void *value, size_t vlen)
 {
 	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->cert->raw_subject = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen;
 	return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 87d9cc26f6306..1b76f207c1f3a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@
 
 struct x509_certificate {
 	struct x509_certificate *next;
+	struct x509_certificate *signer;	/* Certificate that signed this one */
 	struct public_key *pub;			/* Public key details */
+	struct public_key_signature sig;	/* Signature parameters */
 	char		*issuer;		/* Name of certificate issuer */
 	char		*subject;		/* Name of certificate subject */
 	char		*fingerprint;		/* Key fingerprint as hex */
@@ -25,7 +27,16 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	unsigned	tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
 	unsigned	raw_sig_size;		/* Size of sigature */
 	const void	*raw_sig;		/* Signature data */
-	struct public_key_signature sig;	/* Signature parameters */
+	const void	*raw_serial;		/* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
+	unsigned	raw_serial_size;
+	unsigned	raw_issuer_size;
+	const void	*raw_issuer;		/* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
+	const void	*raw_subject;		/* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
+	unsigned	raw_subject_size;
+	unsigned	index;
+	bool		seen;			/* Infinite recursion prevention */
+	bool		verified;
+	bool		trusted;
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 382ef0d2ff2e5..f3d62307e6eef 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -18,11 +18,86 @@
 #include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
 #include "public_key.h"
 #include "x509_parser.h"
 
+static bool use_builtin_keys;
+static char *ca_keyid;
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
+		ca_keyid = str;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
+	else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
+		use_builtin_keys = true;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
+ * @keyring: The keys to search.
+ * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs.
+ * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string.
+ *
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID.  These might,
+ * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
+ * certificate that needs to be verified.
+ */
+struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+					const char *subject,
+					const char *key_id)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id);
+	char *id;
+
+	/* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */
+	id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!id)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	memcpy(id, subject, subject_len);
+	id[subject_len + 0] = ':';
+	id[subject_len + 1] = ' ';
+	memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len);
+	id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0;
+
+	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+
+	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+			     &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", id, PTR_ERR(key));
+	kfree(id);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+			/* Hide some search errors */
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -ENOTDIR:
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		default:
+			return ERR_CAST(key);
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__,
+		 key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
+	return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key);
+
 /*
  * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
  * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
@@ -103,6 +178,38 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
 
 /*
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
+ * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
+ * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
+ */
+static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
+			       struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	if (!trust_keyring)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+					  cert->issuer, cert->authority);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key))  {
+		if (!use_builtin_keys
+		    || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
+			ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data, cert);
+		key_put(key);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
  * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
  */
 static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
@@ -155,9 +262,13 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
 	if (!cert->authority ||
 	    strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
-		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
+		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error_free_cert;
+	} else if (!prep->trusted) {
+		ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
+		if (!ret)
+			prep->trusted = 1;
 	}
 
 	/* Propose a description */
@@ -177,7 +288,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
 	prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
 	prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
-	prep->payload = cert->pub;
+	prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
 	prep->description = desc;
 	prep->quotalen = 100;